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Stromire: Private Aircraft Pilot/Owner Liability
NOTES
thest that the courts are willing to go, apparently, is to say that
such a policy cannot be enforced by means of state action and that
it is valid only so long as it is done on a voluntary basis. It is not
the job of the judiciary to remove bias and prejudice from the minds
of men.
JOSEPH H. WEIL

PRIVATE AIRCRAFT PILOT/OWNER LIABILITY
This is an era of space satellites, guided missiles, and supersonic
jet aircraft. Commercial jet airliners provide service to the world's
major terminals; scientists predict manned space travel within a few
years. Less publicized than these developments, but just as spectacular, is the growth of the civilian aviation fleet. Privately owned airplanes in the United States outnumber the combined military aircraft of the United States and Russia, and it is predicted that 105,000
private aircraft will be swarming the skyways by 1975.' The private
airplane is no longer restricted to stunt and pleasure flying; it has
proved to be a versatile work horse. Airplanes are used to patrol
fences, herd cattle, and spray crops. Executives and salesmen increase
their productivity by utilizing air transportation. Remote locations
are quickly accessible; rush deliveries of critical orders are routine.
And with the expansion of the private airplane fleet, the risk of injury
to persons and property increases.
Although the growth of the aviation industry, stimulated by two
major wars, has been phenomenal, relatively few cases concerning
aviation have been litigated. Many special problems have arisen in
these cases. For example, there may be no survivors of a crash and
no witnesses. To judges, attorneys, and jurors not familiar with
aerodynamics, the testimony of expert witnesses is difficult to understand. Decisions ludicrous to pilots have resulted from the adaptation
of common law concepts to twentieth-century problems. 2 The purpose
of this note is to discuss the privileges and liabilities of private airplane owners and pilots.3
'Time, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 92, col. 1 (66,000 private airplanes now in use).
2Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W.2d 806 (1943) (recovery denied
passenger's widow because passenger might have been in control).
3Problems peculiar to military and commercial (passengers for pay) aviation
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GENERAL TORT LIABILITY

There is no body of tort law exclusively applicable to aviation
accidents. Generally, the common law tort principles that establish
liability in ordinary accidents apply with equal force to determine the
liability of airplane owners and pilots. The application of land tort
principles to aviation accidents has been established by case law in
Florida 4 and a number of other jurisdictions 5 and has been codified
by statute in at least three states. 6 These rules of tort law inadequately
define the limits of liability. For example, in Peavey v. Miami the
Florida Supreme Court indicated that "'an aviator is under no duty
to use the highest degree of care that men of reasonable diligence or
foresight ordinarily exercise in the operation of airplanes .... .'-. The
degree of care will vary with the circumstances; a high degree of
care will be required in some circumstances and a slight degree in
others.8 Necessarily, the controlling principle is vague, and in cases
in which there is little or no evidence of negligence, presumptions
must be applied. In Bird v. Louer,9 in which there was no evidence
of negligence, both pilots and a passenger had been killed in the
mid-air collision of two airplanes. The pilot of the defendant's airplane was presumed not to be negligent because of his great aviation
experience and known skill as a pilot. The other pilot was not licensed and was known to be a careless, inexpert aviator. In a number
of similar cases, in which there was no evidence of negligence, the
courts have been reluctant to employ presumptions or the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in order to fasten liability on individual pilots.
The courts, however, have not been as lenient with corporate airplane
owners.
A corportion will be liable for injuries proximately caused by its
aircraft while the pilot is acting within the scope of his employment.1O
are omitted.
4Peavey v. Miami, 146 Fla. 629, 1 So.2d 614 (1941);

Kasanof v. Embry-Riddle

Co., 157 Fla. 677, 26 So.2d 889 (1946).
5Central Flying Serv. v. Crigger, 215 Ark. 400, 221 S.W.2d 45 (1949); State ex

rel. Birckhead v. Sammon, 171 Md. 178, 189 At. 265 (1936); Hough v. Rapidair,
Inc., 298 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. 1957).
cGA. CODE ANN. §11-107 (Supp. 1955); MicH. STAT. ANN.
2,§1472 (1956).
,146 Fla. 629, 640, 1 So.2d 614, 618 (1941).

§10.277

(1952); PA.

STAT. ANN. tit.

sPeavey v. Miami, 146 Fla. 629, 1 So.2d 614 (1941).
9272 111. App. 522 (1933).
1OBugh v. Employers' Reinsurance Corp., 63 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1933); Spartan
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In Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen 1 the defendant corporation
was held liable to the survivors of deceased customers that the defendant's salesman had flown to a night baseball game in his own
airplane. Another court discovered that the pilot-employee was
within the scope of his employment simply because the corporation
president overheard plans for the fatal flight without voicing any
objection.12 Infrequently corporations have escaped liability. For instance, in one case an exuberant aviator took two of his friends for
a free acrobatic ride in the corporation airplane;' 3 in another a
corporation president invited passengers on a pleasure ride in the
14
company airplane.
Liability is not restricted to injuries inflicted within or by the
aircraft. For example, in the pioneer case of Neiswonger v. Goodyear
Tire 6- Rubber Co.15 it was held that the plaintiff stated a cause of
action when he alleged that his team of horses, frightened by the defendant's low-flying dirigible, had dragged a farm wagon over him.
The tendency of the courts to regard the airplane as an inherently
dangerous machine increases the risk of liability. A careless, inattentive individual walking into the path of an approaching automobile is likely to be found contributorily negligent, but an individual
who strolls into a whirling propellor after a free airplane ride is not. 6
In Florida, the owner of the airplane may be liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. A recent federal decision indicates that
the airplane should be classified with the automobile as a dangerous
instrumentality." In this case liability was imposed on the defendant without resort to the doctrine of respondeat superior when its
special agent, flying a company plane, made a hard landing that injured the plaintiff passenger. Undoubtedly this decision will be a
strong factor influencing the Florida Supreme Court if the classification of the airplane as a dangerous instrumentality becomes an issue.
Aircraft Co. v. Jamison, 181 Okla. 645, 75 P.2d 1096 (1938).
1"214 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1954).
12Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Serv., Inc., 231 N.C. 181, 56 S.E.2d 560 (1949).
23Sheboygan Airways, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 209 Wis. 352, 245 N.W. 178

(1932).
'4Grimm v. Gargis, 303 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. 1957).
L535 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929).
16Cape Charles Flying Serv., Inc. v. Nottingham, 187 Va. 444, 47 S.E.2d 540

(1948).
"7Grain Dealers Natl Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 190 F.2d 726 (5th Cir.
1951). This question was certified to the Florida Supreme Court, which refused

to answer on a procedural ground. Sieverts

v.

Loffer, 45 So.2d 483 (1950).
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If the Florida Supreme Court does apply the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to airplanes, the small aircraft owner will be liable to
passengers and persons injured outside the aircraft when it is used
with his knowledge and consent.'
This possible risk of absolute
liability should be adequately covered by insurance.
RIGHTS TO THE SKY

Although the common law concept that the ownership of land
extends to the periphery of the universe has long been abandoned, 19
there is a continuing conflict between landowners and aviators using
the airspace over the land. Theories ranging from "every flight a
trespass" to the privileged flight doctrine have been developed 2 in
an attempt to define the rights of the parties. In addition, Congress
has declared that "a public right of freedom of transit in air commerce" exists throughout the navigable air space of the United
States. 21 The navigable air space is defined as "airspace above the
minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority. ' ' 22 The theory most consistent with this statutory declaration of rights is the privileged flight doctrine. Florida, by a recent
Supreme Court decision, adopted it:23
"[Tihe operator of an airplane is 'privileged' to enter the
airspace above land in the possession of another, so long as he
does so in a reasonable manner, at such a height as is in conformity with legislative requirements, and without interfering
unreasonably with the possessor's enjoyment of the surface of
the earth and the airspace above it."
The Court stated that "their rights are generally held to be co-equal,
with the balance if any, in favor of the landowner."24
Most of the aviator-landowner litigation has been concerned with
'sCf. Crenshaw Bros. Prod. Co. v. Harper, 142 Fla. 27, 194 So. 353 (1940);
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920); see Note, 5
U. FLA. L. REv. 412 (1952).

19United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
2OPROssEr, TORTS §13 (2d ed. 1955).
2152 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §403 (1956).
2252 STAT. 979 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §401 (24) (1956).
2
3Reaver v. Martin Theatres, Inc., 52 So.2d 682, 683 (Fla. 1951).
241d. at 684.
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enjoyment of the land,25 but recent cases have involved interference
with the aviator's privileged flight. A Florida municipal corporation
was held liable for damages incurred by an aircraft when it was flown
into an unmarked artificial obstruction while landing on a navigable
waterway.261 In an action for the death of an aviator whose aircraft
struck the defendant's power transmission lines, the Pennsylvania
2
Supreme Court declared: 7
"If the owner of any instrumentality, equipment, or device has
reason to believe or expect that an airplane will use the legalized
unoccupied air space above his installation and he erects or
permits to exist an obstruction which, without fault on the
part of the aviator, will do damage to the pilot or his aircraft,
the owner of the installation will be as responsible for the
damage done the aircraft and its passengers as if he shot down
the aircraft." (Emphasis added).
On the basis of this case a proposal has been made to impose a
duty on landowners to disclose any obstructions on their property
that could be hazardous to flight. 28 This would be highly desirable,
since there is no federal regulation requiring notice of such obstructions other than those situated near airports and along civil airways.29
It is important to note that Florida has an enabling act which authorizes municipalities to enact airport zoning regulations. 30 One case
involving the violation of such regulations resulted in an injunction
1
which limited the height of a decorative tower near an airport.3
CIVIL AIR REGULATIONS

Barring litigation, a pilot may never be aware of common law
25E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Leisy v. United States, 102
F. Supp. 789 (D. Minn. 1952); Miller v. Maples, 278 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1954).
2
6Strawn v. Leesburg, 6 Fla. Supp. 124 (Cir. Ct. 1954). See also Stephens and
Mathias (Rockland Ainvays) v. MacMillan, 1954 U.S. 8:Can. Av. R. 37 (Ont. High
Ct. J. 1954).
27Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 385 Pa. 520, 541, 123 A.2d 636, 648
(1956).
2824 J. Am L. & Com. 362 (1957).
2914 C.F.R. §§625.1-.5 (1958).
0FLA. STAT. §333.02 (1957).
3lSarasota-Manatee Airport Authority v. Harrell's Candy Kitchen, 1958 U.S.
& Can. Av. R. 238 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1957).
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standards of care, but he must be acquainted with some of the innumerable Civil Air Regulations3 - in order to make a routine flight.
The rules and regulations promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics Authority ior the operation of aircraft have both intrastate and interstate application. 33 Since these rules are designed primarily for the
safe and orderly flow of air traffic, they are good standards upon
which negligence liability may be based. This should not, however,
oversimplify the problem. For example, one regulation requires that
no aircraft be operated below a certain altitude above the terrain
except during take-offs and landings. 34 Accidents have resulted from
violations of this minimum altitude rule, but this should not impose
liability on an aviator solely because of the violation. An aviator
may necessarily violate a regulation to avoid unforeseeable adverse
weather conditions. Violation of the regulation should not constitute negligence as a matter of law, and at least one case has so held. 35

Many cases have predicated negligence on violation of the regulations,36 but close examination reveals that the facts would have supported a finding of negligence regardless of any violation. If a violation
of the regulations occurs without substantial justification, the better
approach would be to have the jury consider it as evidence of negligence. A second alternative is to permit such violation to give rise
to a rebuttable presumption of negligence in favor of the plaintiff.
This is not desirable, however, since in the more serious accidents
there may be no survivors and thus no possibility of rebutting the
presumption.
GUEST STATUTES

Most jurisdictions have attempted to apply automobile guest
statutes to aviation litigation, with the result that there are nearly
as many standards of care as there are guest statutes. Two courts
have stated unequivocally that the airplane is not a motor vehicle
within the meaning of their automobile guest statute. 37 At least two
3214 C.F.R. §§1-635 (1958).
33Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire &Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929).
3414 C.F.R. §60.17 (1956).
35Hough v. Rapidair, Inc., 298 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. 1957).
36San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 173 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1949);

Brouse v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ohio 1949); Corkran v. United States,
79 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
35 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929); Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953);
Rinehart v. Woodford Flying Serv., Inc., 122 W. Va. 392, 9 S.E.2d 521 (1940).
37Hayden v. Boyle, 174 Kan. 140, 254 P.2d 813 (1953); Hanson v. Lewis, 26
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states have resolved any uncertainty by enacting specific aircraft guest
statutes. 38 There seems to be no valid basis for imposing a greater
burden on a pilot carrying a gratuitous passenger than on an automobile driver in similar circumstances. Even in jurisdictions which
have an aircraft guest statute the courts have been eager to seize
any opportunity to preclude its application. For example, prospective buyers viewing a ranch from an airplane have been found to be
"passengers for consideration" and not within the provisions of the
guest statutes; 39 the same result was reached in another case in which
40
the consideration given was an automobile ride.
Florida does not have an aircraft guest statute, and it is doubtful
whether the airplane would be considered a "motor vehicle" within
the meaning of the automobile guest statute, 41 since the Legislature
defined this term to include only those vehicles propelled by power
over the streets and highways of the state. 42 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, applying Florida law to pilot-guest litigation, reached the
same conclusion. 43 Assuming that the Florida Supreme Court adopts
this view, a pilot's liability to a guest passenger will probably be
determined in accordance with the flexible standard expressed in
4
Peavey v. Miami. 4
THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF CROP DUSTING

The airplane has been utilized many years for crop dusting, which
is the technique of releasing insecticides from airplanes in order to
treat fruit trees, vegetables, and grain crops. The crop dusters have
eliminated innumerable pests; but, as might be expected, the pestkilling chemical clouds sometimes drift from the target area to surrounding farms. Bees, animals, and neighboring crops become casualties along with the noxious weeds and insects.
Much of the crop dusting litigation has been precipitated by
damage done to apiaries.45 In an early Arizona case the aggrieved
Ohio L. Abs. 105 (C.P. Ct. 1937).
3SCAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §21406 (Deering 1957); S.C. CoDE §2-21 (1952).
39Halbert v. Berlinger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 6, 273 P.2d 274 (1954).
40Stiles v. American Trust Co., 137 Cal. App. 2d 472, 290 P.2d 614 (1955).
41FLA. STAT. §320.59 (1957).
42FLA. STAT. §320.01 (1) (1957).
43Gridley v. Cardenas, 3 Wis. 2d 623, 89 N.W.2d 286 (1958).
44146 Fla. 629, 1 So.2d 614 (1941). See discussion under heading "General Tort
Liability," supra.
45Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P.2d 454 (1948); S. A. Gerrard Co. v.
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beekeeper recovered damages from the owner of the land being
sprayed simply by proving that the insecticide had killed multitudes of
his bees. 4 6 In later cases the tendency has been to hold both the landowner and the crop duster liable if the following factors can be
established: (1) The injury was foreseeable, (2) the pilot was negli47
gent, and (3) the negligent act was the proximate cause of the injury.
The landowner's liability is based on the theory that a landowner cannot use his land in such a manner that foreseeable injury to his
neighbor will result. 4" The landowner cannot shift responsibility to
the dusting company on the basis that it is an independent contractor,
because a dangerous duty cannot be delegated." ° Recovery was denied
in one case in which the plaintiff beekeeper had been contributorily
negligent by failing to take precautionary measures after receiving
notice of the dusting operation,5o and in another in which the bees
had trespassed and picked up the poison.51
The pattern of crop dusting litigation involving injuries to crops
and animals has been similar to the bee cases. Liability has been imposed when the insecticide poisoned cattle s2 and damaged neighboring
crops.A3 The small airplane owner who is engaged in crop dusting
operations and the landowner whose land is being treated should
take every precaution to insure that the job is performed in accordance
with applicable regulations.5 4 In addition, advance notice should be
given to surrounding landowners and the dusting suspended if the
insecticide begins to drift over adjacent property.
Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678 (1933); McKennon v. Jones, 219 Ark. 671, 244
S.W.2d 138 (1951); Lenk v. Spezia, 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 213 P.2d 47 (1949); Jeanes
v. Holtz, 94 Cal. App. 2d 826, 211 P.2d 925 (1949); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal.
App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260 (1937); Brown v. Sioux City, 242 Iowa 1196, 49 N.W.2d
853 (1951); see Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 436 (1950), for collected cases.
46S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678 (1933).
47Lundberg v. Bolon, supra note 45; McKennon v. Jones, supra note 45; Lenk v.
Spezia, supra note 45.
48Lundberg v. Bolon, supra note 45; Miles v. A. Arena & Co., supra note 45.
49S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, supra note 45; McKennon v. Jones, supra note
45; Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953).
5oLenk v. Spezia, 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 213 P.2d 47 (1949).
Sijeanes v. Holtz, 94 Cal. App. 2d 826, 211 P.2d 925 (1949).
52Sanders v. Beckwith, 79 Ariz. 67, 283 P.2d 235 (1955).

53Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So.2d 293 (1957) (theory of strict liability
imposed on nonnegligent defendants); Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262
P.2d 231 (1953) (cotton).
54A law authorizing landowners to organize protected areas in which chemical
spraying would not be allowed has been declared unconstitutional. Demers v.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss3/8

8

Stromire: Private Aircraft Pilot/Owner Liability
NOTES
THE PROBLEMS OF PROOF

Frequently, in aviation accidents, there are no survivors and few,
if any, witnesses. Consequently, injured parties have an extremely
difficult task in proving fault. 55 In situations in which the plaintiff
cannot obtain any evidence by his own investigation, he may resort
to the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The CAB is required by statute to investigate aircraft accidents56
in order to prevent the recurrence of similar mishaps. Normally,
everyone except rescue workers and law enforcement officers is excluded from the scene of the accident during the CAB's initial investigation so that important evidence may be preserved. 57 CAB
investigators may not give opinion evidence as expert witnesses; 58
however, if the CAB investigator is the sole source of evidence reasonably available to the litigants, the CAB is required to make his
testimony available by deposition or in person.5
The CAB investigation reports would also be helpful because of
their obvious evidentiary value. However, a federal statute provides:6 0
"No part of any report of... the Civil Aeronautics Board relating to any accident, or the investigation thereof, shall be
admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages
growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports."
The underlying policy expressed by the statute is to prohibit disclosure of these reports because they might reveal the CAB's view as to
the cause or possible causes of an accident, thereby fixing liability.61
However, one report was admitted since it contained no opinions or
conclusions as to the cause of the accident or the defendant's negligence. 62 The statutory prohibition does not prevent the testimony
Peterson, 197 Ore. 466, 254 P.2d 213 (1953).
55See Galiher, Problems Confronting Trial Counsel in Aviation Cases, 6
CATHoLic U.L. Rzv. 149 (1957).
5652 STAT. 1013 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §582 (1957).

5-14 C.F.R. §§62.15-.16, 62.41-A3 (1956).
5814 C.F.R. §311.3 (1956).
59Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
1951); 14 C.F.R. §311.3 (1957).
6052 STAT. 1012 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §581 (1957).
6eRitts v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 457, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
62Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F-2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951).
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of a witness examined by the CAB in the course of its investigation, 63
nor is the statute violated when a report is used to refresh the memory
of a CAB investigator testifying on the facts revealed by his investigation.64
RES IPSA LOQUITUR

In those cases in which there is no evidence of fault, the plaintiff's
last resort is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The following elements
must be shown in order to invoke the doctrine: (1) The thing which
caused the injury was in the exclusive control of the defendant, (2)
the injury ordinarily would not have occurred but for someone's
negligence, (3) the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. 65 A few
courts have achieved absurd results, from an aviator's viewpoint, by
strict adherence to the exclusive control element. Three courts have
held that the mere fact that the passenger had access to the aircraft's
66
dual controls was sufficient to prevent application of the doctrine.
Another court achieved the same result even though there was no
evidence that the deceased passenger had ever been inside an airplane
61
prior to the fatal flight.

Recently, the decisions indicate a tendency to apply the exclusive
control element liberally. In one case the pilot was presumed to be
in control of the aircraft because the tower operator had identified
the pilot's voice when he requested landing instructions."8

Although

the opinion in that case did not discuss whether an instruction had
been given to the jury on res ipsa loquitur, it would not have been
error, since the plaintiff's recovery was predicated on the pilot's being
in control at the time of the accident. In another case, which did not
go to the jury, the court, in discussing who was at the controls at the
time of the accident, stated that it was "hardly conceivable that their
relative positions as passenger and pilot changed during the ma69

neuver."

63Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
64Maxwell v. Fink, 264 Wis. 106, 58 N.W.2d 415 (1953).
65PROSSER, TORTs 201

(2d ed. 1955).

66Parker v. James Granger, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 668, 52 P.2d 226 (1935); In re Estate
of Hayden, 174 Kan. 140, 254 P.2d 813 (1953); Budgett v. Soo Sky Ways, Inc., 64
S.D. 243, 266 N.W. 253 (1936).
GlTowle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W.2d 806 (1943).
68Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Larsen, 214 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1954).
69Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Serv., Inc., 231 N.C. 181, 187, 56 S.E.2d 560, 564 (1949).
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In the early development of aviation it was held that there was
a good probability that an airplane accident might occur even in the
absence of anyone's negligence, 70 thereby precluding the use of the
doctrine. But inasmuch as the airplane has proved its reliability, the
argument is no longer valid7l and is seldom made today.
Adverse weather conditions may cause an accident and hence
defeat application of the doctrine. However, the fact that adverse
weather was encountered would not prevent an instruction on res
ipsa loquitur. For example, assume a situation in which it could be
established that an accident very likely occurred because of severe
thunderstorm activity. The aviator's negligence in preflight planning
could be shown by the fact that he knew of the weather and took no
precautions to avoid it. It might also be shown that he attempted a
flight which was beyond his capabilities.
This doctrine has been discussed in reference to a single aircraft involved in an accident, but attention should be brought to its possible use in regard to mid-air collisions, which are notorious for their
lack of survivors. Normally, mid-air collisions should not occur unless one or both of the aircraft involved are negligently operated. Admittedly, a mid-air collision could result from improper separation
by the ground controllers during instrument flight conditions in
which both aircraft were under positive control. In the absence of
this, however, a passenger's survivor suing for wrongful death
should be allowed an instruction on res ipsa loquitur against the
owners of the two aircraft when joined in the same suit. The plaintiff should not be denied recovery because he is unable to pinpoint the
negligence. Use of the doctrine in this situation seems desirable, and
it would not place an undue burden on the aircraft owners, since
they would probably be insured. Although no case has been found
in which this has been attempted, an analogous result has been
72
achieved against numerous defendants in the same malpractice suit.
C. STROMnmR
RoBERT T. WXsTMAN
LEON

7OCohn v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 17 F. Supp. 865 (D.C. Wyo. 1937);
Wilson v. Colonial Air Transp., Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212 (1932); Smith
v. Whitley, 223 N.C. 534, 27 S.E.2d 442 (1943).
71
PRossER, TORTS 203 (2d ed. 1955).
72Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
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